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Effects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s
dilemma
Zhi-Xi Wu∗ and Petter Holme†
Department of Physics, Ume˚a, University, 901 87 Ume˚a, Sweden
Spatial games are crucial for understanding patterns of cooperation in nature (and to some extent
society). They are known to be more sensitive to local symmetries than e.g. spin models. This paper
concerns the evolution of the prisoner’s dilemma game on regular lattices with three different types
of neighborhoods — the von Neumann-, Moore-, and kagome types. We investigate two kinds
of dynamics for the players to update their strategies (that can be unconditional cooperator or
defector). Depending on the payoff difference, an individual can adopt the strategy of a random
neighbor (a voter-model-like dynamics, VMLD), or impose its strategy on a random neighbor, i.e.,
invasion-like dynamics (IPLD). In particular, we focus on the effects of noise, in combination with
the strategy dynamics, on the evolution of cooperation. We find that VMLD, compared to IPLD,
better supports the spreading and sustaining of cooperation. We see that noise has nontrivial effects
on the evolution of cooperation: maximum cooperation density can be realized either at a medium
noise level, in the limit of zero noise, or in both these regions. The temptation to defect and the local
interaction structure determine the outcome. Especially, in the low noise limit, the local interaction
plays a crucial role in determining the fate of cooperators. We elucidate these both by numerical
simulations and mean-field cluster approximation methods.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge, 05.50.+q
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, a great deal of interest has been de-
voted to understanding the evolution of cooperation [1],
i.e., how cooperation emerges and persists in a popula-
tion composed of selfish individuals. Evolutionary game
theory [2, 3] — a research field cultivated tradition-
ally by both evolutionary biologists, political scientists,
economists and mathematician [4, 5] that recently has
attracted a growing interest from the physics commu-
nity [6, 7] — provides a general framework to address
such issues. One famous metaphor for the problem of co-
operation is the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game [8, 9], in
which defection could benefit the individual in the short
term, whereas cooperation has only potential benefits in
a longer time perspective. In the common mathemati-
cal formulation of PD with pairwise interaction, each of
two encountering cooperators (defectors) get a payoff R
(P ), a defector confronting a cooperator acquires payoff
T , while the cooperator gains S. The four parameters is
required to satisfy the conditions T > R > P > S and
2R > T + S. In a well-mixed population, defectors are
unbeatable and cooperators are doomed to extinction [4].
The seminal work of Nowak and May [10], where a
PD game is played on two-dimensional grids with agents
lacking memory and ability to form complex strategies,
showed that spatial structure and nearest neighbor inter-
actions can enable cooperators to survive by forming clus-
ters within which they benefit from mutual cooperation
and protecting them from exploitation by defectors. This
∗zhi-xi.wu@physics.umu.se
†petter.holme@physics.umu.se
work has inspired numerous subsequent investigations of
evolutionary games on spatial grids [11, 12]. Now the spa-
tial (or network) reciprocity is regarded as one of the five
main mechanisms supporting cooperation [5, 14]. Fur-
thermore, coevolution of strategy distribution and under-
lying interaction graphs can also be useful in characteriz-
ing the PD game [15, 16, 17, 18]. The crucial observation
is that through switching partners, cooperators are capa-
ble of frequently meeting other cooperators, which sub-
stantially increase their reproduction rate. In addition, a
lots of other mechanisms favoring cooperation have also
been proposed: volunteering participation [19], separa-
tion of interaction and learning graphs [20], dilution and
random diffusion of agents on the grid [21], success-driven
migration [22], memory effects [23], reputation-based in-
teraction [24], moderate aspiration level [25], etc. For a
comprehensive review of this research field, we refer to
Refs. [5, 6].
It is worth pointing out that the scale-free topology,
thanks to the capability of mutual protection of the hubs
if occupied by cooperators, can enhance the spreading of
cooperative behavior and resist the invasion of defection,
hence becoming a promoter of cooperation [13]. How-
ever, it was also argued that the adoption of averaged
payoffs instead of accumulated ones in the score func-
tion, as well as an introduction of participation costs,
might weaken this mechanism [26]. These results suggest
that the distinct ability of strategy breeding of the play-
ers [27], rather than the interaction graph, matters much
for the emergence of cooperation. The heterogeneous
or asymmetric strategy migration ability can be imple-
mented in different ways, such as dynamic preferential
selection [28], introduction of two types of players with
different teaching activity [29], social diversity [30, 31],
nonlinear attractive effect [32, 33], etc. In principle, as
2long as some distinguished players have higher influence
to spread their strategy [31], and also the connections
among these influential players are coupled in some ap-
propriate way [27, 29, 30], the dilemma can be relaxed
and the promotion of cooperation is warranted.
These results suggest that the heterogeneity in the mi-
gration of strategies might be an important factor for
the stability of cooperation. To our knowledge, in most
previous studies of spatial games, a common simplifying
assumption is that, whenever updating strategy, a player
selects a neighbor as reference and attempts to adopt
the neighbor’s strategy according to some prescribed cri-
terion. In other words, the focal player is always a recip-
ient of the strategy. Only few works have studied the re-
verse situation, with strategy donors and their influence
on the evolution of cooperation. Ohtsuki et al. imple-
mented both death-birth and birth-death updating for
games on graphs, and found that for birth-death updat-
ing, selection does not favor cooperation [34]. Antal et al.
studied evolutionary dynamics on degree-heterogeneous
graphs, evolved either by one individual dying and being
replaced by the offspring of a random neighbor (voter
model dynamics) or by an individual giving birth to an
offspring taking over a random neighbor (invasion pro-
cess dynamics). They found that the fixation probability
of a single fitter mutant under the voter model dynamics
is k2 times of corresponding value for the invasion process
dynamics (k is the node degree) [35]. With this paper,
we continue investigating the effects of the direction of
strategy migration on the evolution of cooperation in the
spatially explicit PD game. Another theme of recent re-
search is the effects of noise on dynamic processes [36].
Indeed, noise (or mutation) plays an important role in
the outcome of evolutionary games [37, 38]. In recent
years, the effects of noise on spatial games have also been
studied [39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. The spatial PD model pro-
posed in [10] is a deterministic cellular automaton and
can be extended to a stochastic version by introduction
of noise in different ways. Perhaps the first spatial PD
model with a stochastic strategy adoption process was
proposed in Ref. [44]. We take the approach of Szabo´
and To˝ke [39], where the players updates their strategies
according to a Fermi function and in which noise have the
role of temperature in the kinetic Ising model. For this
simple “noise-guided” evolutionary model, the authors
found rich dynamic phenomena — two absorbing states
consisting of only cooperators and defectors separated
by a coexistence region. Particularly, the phase transi-
tion involving the extinction of cooperators or defectors is
found to belong to the universality class of directed per-
colation [39]. In a similar vein, they also studied how the
noise affects the phase diagram of PD on different two-
dimensional lattices and Newman–Watts networks [40].
In somewhat different approach, Perc et al. and Tanimoto
introduced noise to the payoff matrix [43, 45]. The re-
ported results show a coherence-resonance phenomenon
where the fraction of cooperators reaches its maximum
at an intermediate noise level [43]. In Ref. [40] the noise
effect in PD games was studied, mainly focusing on the
threshold of extinction of cooperation as a function of
noise intensity. A clear picture for how the average frac-
tion of cooperation evolves by varying the noise level un-
der different intensities of the temptation to defection, to
the best of our knowledge, is still lacking. In the present
work, we will follow the research line of Refs. [34, 35, 40]
to study how the strategy migration direction and se-
lection noise affect the cooperation. In the rest of the
paper, we first define our model and then treat the prob-
lems sketched above both by computer simulations and
cluster approximation methods. Finally, we make some
discussions and draw our conclusion.
II. MODEL
In the present study, we consider the evolutionary PD
on three types of regular lattices with periodic bound-
ary conditions, namely square lattice with von Neumann
neighborhood (von Neumann lattice), square lattice with
Moore neighborhood (Moore lattice), and kagome lattice,
such that the number of encounters of each player are
four, eight, and six, respectively. The reason we concen-
trate on these simple lattices is twofold: first, previous
studies have found that local interaction does affect the
spreading of cooperation [12, 40]; second, their regular
structures allow us to implement mean-field cluster ap-
proximation analysis [6, 7, 40].
Following many studies [6, 31, 39, 40], we use the
Nowak–May parameterization [10] of the spatial PD, i.e.,
the temptation to defect T = b (where 1 < b < 2), the
reward for mutual cooperation R = 1, the punishment of
mutual defection P = 0, and the sucker’s payoff S = 0.
Initially, we let the players be either unconditional coop-
erators (C) or defectors (D) with equal probability. The
evolution of strategies is governed by random sequential
updating. For each of the considered lattice topologies,
we first let a randomly chosen player i reap its payoff
Pi by playing the PD game with its nearest neighbors.
Then, we select a random neighbor j of i, and let it ac-
quire its payoff Pj by playing the game with its nearest
neighbors.
When updating strategy, the focal player i can be of
the role of either strategy donor or strategy-recipient. If
i is the strategy-recipient, we implement a voter-model-
like dynamics (VMLD) [35], which is probably the most
common approach [6, 13, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 39, 40, 41,
42, 43]. In this case, the player i imitates the strategy of
j with a probability dependent on their payoff difference
[39]
Wij =
1
1 + exp [(Pi − Pj)/κ]
, (1)
where κ ∈ [0,∞) denotes the noise level (or, in the lan-
guage of evolutionary biology, selection intensity [14]).
In the κ = 0 limit, the adoption of a successful strategy
is deterministic, while in the κ → ∞ limit, the strategy
3learning is blind [40]. If, however, we treat the player
i as the strategy donor, we implement exactly invasion-
process-like dynamics (IPLD) for the game [35]. In this
case, the neighbor j will try to take the focal player i’s
strategy with a probability defined as
Wji =
1
1 + exp [(Pj − Pi)/κ]
. (2)
By tuning the values of b and κ in the framework of the
two updating schemes, we can obtain pictures of how the
noise intensity and direction of strategy migration impact
the final outcome of the evolutionary spatial PD game.
In our simulation, we consider the possible strategy-
migration for the players one by one according to a ran-
dom sequence. One pass through all the agents is called
a Monte Carlo (MC) sweep. Between each MC sweep we
reshuffle the sampling sequence. The total population is
of size 200 × 200 for the von Neumann and Moore lat-
tices, and 3 × 100 × 100 for the kagome lattice. When
repeating the above described elementary steps the sys-
tem develops into a final stationary state characterized
by the average fraction of cooperators fc, which is mea-
sured for the last 3000 sweeps of the total 2×104. All the
simulation results presented below are averages over 20
independent realizations of initial strategy distribution.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We start by comparing the results from the game with
the VMLD strategy-updating rule with the correspond-
ing IPLD results. In Fig. 1(a), we present the simula-
tion results for fc as a function of the temptation to
defect b on the three lattices, and the noise level κ is
fixed as 0.3. We note that fc decreases monotonously
with increasing b up to a threshold bc, where coopera-
tion vanishes. Although the qualitative properties of the
curves are somewhat similar, there exist quantitative dif-
ferences. By comparison, the stationary cooperation level
in IPLD is lower than the corresponding value for VMLD.
Furthermore, IPLD results in a lower bc-threshold. Thus,
our first finding is that VMLD is more favorable for the
spreading of cooperation than IPLD.
At a first glance, it may seem strange that VMLD and
IPLD on homogeneous graph give rise to different re-
sults, since what is regarded as VMLD from the point
of view of the strategy-recipient is exactly the IPLD in
the viewpoint of the strategy donor. (On heterogeneous
graph, this difference is evident, since high-degree indi-
viduals have greater chance to affect others for VMLD,
and to be affected by others for IPLD.) In fact, the four-
or five-site cluster approximation, developed in the spirit
of mean-field theory [6], do not differentiate between the
VMLD and IPLD, and give out exactly the same results
for both strategy updating dynamics (see Fig. 1(b), the
two curves for the VMLD and IPLD coincide with one an-
other, and for simplicity we just show one). A crucial ob-
servation is that this method neglects spatial correlations
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) Average fraction fc of coopera-
tion as a function of the temptation to defect b for a fixed
noise intensity κ = 0.3 on three types of lattices. Solid and
open symbols correspond to the two strategy-migration dy-
namics VMLD and IPLD, respectively. (b) Theoretical es-
timations by the four-site cluster approximation on the von
Neumann lattice, and by the five-site cluster approximation
on the kagome lattice, correctly predict the evolving tendency
of fc, but do not differentiate between VMLD and IPLD dy-
namics. Note the different scaling of the x-axis in the two
panels.
in the population, which cause the update probabilities
of VMLD and IPLD to differ. Indeed, if the two prob-
abilities are the same, the final results will be identical
on homogeneous graphs. This argument can be deduced
from the studies of voter model on graphs. In Ref. [47],
Castellano studied both voter and anti-voter dynamics
on networks (corresponding to the VMLD and IPLD in
this work), and found that on homogeneous network, the
consensus time in both dynamics is the same. In [35],
Antal et al. pointed out that the fixation probability of a
neutral genotype on homogeneous graph is the same for
both voter-model and invasion-process dynamics. The
essential difference between the voter model and evolu-
tionary games is that in voter model, when a randomly
selected individual is to update its state, only the state of
the selected neighbor matters, while in the PD game case,
both the state of the selected neighbor and those of this
neighbor’s neighbors. For our setup, the average payoffs
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Time series of NC/ND, the number of
events of D switching to C divided by the reverse case, for
b = 1.02 and 1.045 on the von Neumann lattice.
collected by cooperators on the boundary is greater than
that by defectors [33], we argue that VMLD favors the
diffusion of cooperation on the rough boundaries sepa-
rating cooperators from defectors stronger than IPLD.
(In the Appendix, we have presented a concrete example
to analyze the difference between the VMLD and IPLD
determining the probability of strategy-migration.) A
defector at a rough boundary would have, on average,
greater chance to be convinced by its cooperating neigh-
bors in the VMLD picture, than a cooperating neighbor
to convince a defector in the IPLD. To test this point,
we have traced the time series of NC/ND, the number of
events of D switching to C divided by the reverse case,
for two special values of b on the von Neumann lattice.
The results presented in Fig. 2 give further evidence for
the above speculation.
Before moving forward, we briefly comment the im-
portance of the network structures in maintaining co-
operation. In previous studies [40] the overlapping tri-
angles (especially, one-site overlapping triangles) in the
connectivity structure are found to support the spreading
(maintenance) of cooperation. Here, we want to point
out that this conclusion is drawn in terms of the mag-
nitude of bc for the evolutionary PD on different lat-
tice structures [40]. Looking back on our simulations
in Fig. 1, we believe that this is not the whole story.
If we measure the capability of promoting cooperation
by the average fraction of cooperation in the equilibrium
state, we observe that when b is small (e.g. b = 1.1), the
one-site overlapping triangles (the kagome lattice) is an
inferior structure compared to the case of multiple over-
lapping sites (the Moore lattice). This indicates that the
temptation parameter is an indicative variable when eval-
uating the role of connectivity structure, giving a more
nuanced picture than the previously mentioned effect of
overlapping triangles in Ref. [40].
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FIG. 3: Average fraction fc of cooperation as a function of
the noise parameter κ for fixed values of b on (a) the von
Neumann lattice, (b) the Moore lattice, and (c) the kagome
lattice. The solid and open symbols are as shown in Fig. 1.
The lines are guides to the eye.
Now let us turn to the effect of noise. As mentioned
above, the extinction threshold of cooperation bc as a
function of κ on different types of lattices has been stud-
ied in [29, 40]. Here we investigate how κ influences fc in
the stationary state for different values of b. In Fig. 3(a),
we show simulation results of fc versus κ for two values of
b = 1.02, b = 1.045 on the von Neumann lattice. We ob-
serve so-called coherence resonance for both VMLD and
IPLD, where fc reaches its maximum at an intermediate
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Replotting of the data in Fig. 3 for b =
1.04 on the Moore lattice with the VMLD (a), and b = 1.12
on the kagome lattice with the IPLD (b). The places where
fc reaches its maximum value are indicated by arrows.
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FIG. 5: Average fraction fc of cooperation versus κ in the
case of “high” temptation to defect b = 1.2 on the kagome
lattice. The solid line denotes the analytical results obtained
by the five-site cluster approximation.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Theoretical estimations for fc as a
function of κ by using the four-site cluster approximation
method on the von Neumann lattice (a), the five-site cluster
approximation on the kagome lattice (b). The arrows mark
the places where fc maximizes when b = 1.12.
κ. If, in this case, the noise is too weak or strong cooper-
ation may be extinct (this is in accordance with previous
results [43]). For the parameters used, the maximum
fc emerges at about κ = 0.3. We note that for the same
temptation to defect, comparing with the case of VMLD,
IPLD results in a narrower region of κ, where coopera-
tors can maintain a non-zero fraction in the population.
That is to say, cooperation is more robust against the
fluctuation of noise in the case of VMLD. This result
strengthens our previous finding from Fig. 1. Note that
limκ→∞ fc = 1/2. In this paper we focus on low noise
levels, i.e. situations where the competitive interactions
dominate the dynamics and do not study how coopera-
tion reemerges for very large κ.
The observed resonant behavior can be understood as
follows. As mentioned above, the noise parameter κ mea-
sures the stochastic uncertainties in the process of strat-
egy learning. In the limit of weak noise, the irrational
choices of the individuals become very rare. The strate-
gies of those individuals who get higher payoffs would al-
ways migrate successfully. Though the payoffs of the de-
fectors at the interface are on average smaller than those
of cooperators [33], the highest payoff is always obtained
6by those defectors surrounded by three other coopera-
tors. As such, if the individuals imitate with complete
rationality (κ → 0), the defective strategy would spread
more easily in the population, which does harm to the
formation of clusters of cooperators. On the other hand,
in the limit of large noise, the payoff information becomes
less important in determining the success of strategy mi-
gration. In such situation, it would be definitely ineffi-
cient for the cooperators at the interface to spread their
behavior (though they acquire higher payoff on average
than those defectors [33]). If, however, the noise κ is
appropriately chosen, i.e., not too large or too small, the
cooperators would have more chance to diffusion, and the
defectors with highest payoff would have less probability
to be followed by cooperators, leading to the surviving
and enhancement of cooperation. Henceforth the opti-
mal noisy intensity κ emerges.
The experimental tests of the PD game on the Moore
and kagome lattices display somewhat similar results
(Figs. 3(b) and (c)). For an appropriate temptation to
defect, when varying κ, we also notice an emergent of co-
herence resonance. Moreover, the VMLD is also found to
be superior to the IPLD in promoting cooperation. De-
spite these two aspects, when κ is sufficiently small, the
simulation results illustrated in Fig. 3(a) are in stark con-
trast to those in Figs. 3(b) and (c). In the former case,
the cooperators are doomed to extinction in the limit of
zero noise, whereas they can persist in the population
with finite fc in the latter two cases. We argue that the
presence of overlapping triangles [40] in the latter two
lattices contributes to the difference, since triangles are
absent in the von Neumann lattice. Note, however, that
the importance of overlapping triangles is evaluated with
bc in [40], and with fc here. Comparing the curves for
b = 1.04 in Figs. 3(b) and (c), keeping Fig. 1 in mind, we
conclude that for high temptation values, one-site over-
lapping triangles gives more favorable conditions for co-
operation, than the multiple-site case. For low tempta-
tion values the situation is reversed.
It is worth noting that the PD game on Moore and
kagome lattices there is a nontrivial dependence of fc on
κ (which depends both on the temptation parameter and
the direction of strategy migration). In particular, for
sufficiently small b, we obtain only one maximum of fc as
a function of κ (the curve in Fig. 3(c) with b = 1.04 and
VMLD). With increasing b, peculiarly, we observe two
peaks of fc(κ), one located at an intermediate value and
the other at κ = 0. This phenomenon is yet more promi-
nent in the case of IPLD (c.f., Fig. 4). Finally, if the value
of b is sufficiently large (the curves of b = 1.1 in Fig. 3(b)
and also Fig. 5), the peak of fc at finite κ disappears and
only the no-noise maximum remains. For comparison, in
Fig. 6 we present analytic results via the four-site cluster
approximation on the von Neumann lattice and five-site
cluster approximation on the kagome lattice (for details,
please see the Appendix in Ref. [6]), and observe that the
theoretical estimations correctly predict the tendency of
the results obtained by our MC simulations.
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FIG. 7: Average fraction fc of cooperation as a function of b
in the case of very weak noise κ = 0.01 on the kagome lattice
(solid squares) and the Moore lattice (open circles).
The simulation results shown in Figs. 3, 4, and 5 allow
us to speculate that in the limit of weak noise, the local
interaction topology may play a decisive role in maintain-
ing cooperation. To test this point further, we present
in Fig. 7 the simulation results for the evolutionary PD
on the Moore lattice and the kagome lattice, where fc as
a function of b is plotted for a fixed value of κ = 0.01.
Here we only consider the VMLD. We find that the co-
operators vanish at about bc = 1.5 for the kagome lattice
(which has already obtained in Ref. [40]), and at about
bc = 1.2 for the Moore lattice. Despite the value of bc,
we note that the average fraction of cooperation fc seems
to be insensitive to the temptation to defect staying as a
plateau as cooperators are capable of surviving (an effect
not studied in Ref. [40]). In the following, we provide a
local configuration analysis for fc in the stationary state
on kagome lattices.
In the limit of weak noise, the strategy-updating rules
Eqs. (1) or (2) is equivalent to the deterministic imitation
dynamics [10], i.e., as long as the payoff of the strategy
donor is greater than that of the strategy recipient, the
strategy will migrate. Since either an isolated coopera-
tor, or a connected pair of cooperators, cannot prevail
surrounded by defectors, consider a five-site cluster of
cooperators fully surrounded by defectors. If b < 3/2,
three cooperators forming a triangle will expand its ter-
ritory to a five-site cluster, see Fig. 8. In that case we
may expect that one of the neighboring defectors, say j,
would since (b < 2) imitate i’s strategy in the next sweep.
Then their common neighbor k may acquire the payoff
2b in the next sweep. However, since i gets a total payoff
3; then, as long as b < 3/2, there is no chance that k’s
strategy can migrate to i. In other words, such a local
configuration in a sea of defectors if b < 3/2 is stable.
However, if a neighbor l of k was a cooperator, the total
7i j
k
l
FIG. 8: (Color online) Local configuration stability analysis
in the limit of zero noise on the kagome lattice. The central
five-site cluster of cooperators cannot be destroyed as long
as b < 3/2 even if no neighbor or next-nearest neighbor is a
cooperator. See the text for details.
payoff of k would be 3b (which is greater than 3), and in
that case k’s strategy could migrate to i, hence destroying
the original cluster. Taken together, the necessary con-
dition for a five-site cluster of cooperators existing stably
on the kagome lattice requires that b < 3/2 and, at the
same time, there is no cooperator in their next-nearest
neighborhood. Since the second-nearest neighbors may
be shared by other five-site cluster of cooperators, we
can estimate fc to 5/(5 + 8 + 14/2) = 1/4 (8 and 14 are
the number of nearest and next-nearest neighbors of the
five-site cluster). This estimation is very close to the one
obtained by MC simulations 0.256(2). Thus this local-
configuration stability analysis gives a good prediction for
fc of evolutionary PD in the limit of weak noise on the
kagome lattice. Indeed, we have visualized the networked
population and found many isolated five-site clusters of
cooperators on the kagome lattice (results now shown
here). The same analysis, with the same conclusions can
be done for the Moore lattice.
The above results might shed some light on the sta-
bility of cooperation in society. Real social networks of-
ten have distinct communities, where individuals in one
groups is densely connected, having relatively few con-
nections to other groups [46]. The emergence of commu-
nity structure may hinder the spread of defection, just as
in the case of the five-site cluster on the kagome lattice
above. In this sense, our society may not be as sensitive
to defection as indicated by the PD on the von Neumann
lattice. On the other hand, we also show that VMLD
is more efficient in maintaining and promoting cooper-
ation than IPLD. Therefore, in the social situations, if
everyone tries learn more from others, it would perhaps
be easier for people to work together efficiently.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have studied the effects of the direc-
tion of strategy migration and noise on the evolution
of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game.
To this end, we have considered two types of strategy
updating dynamics, namely voter-model-like dynamics
and invasion-process-like dynamics, on three types of lat-
tice structures — square lattice with von Neumann and
Moore neighborhoods, and kagome lattice. It was found
that the VMLD, rather than the IPLD, better sustain
and promote cooperation on all the tested lattices. Fur-
thermore, we found noise to have a nontrivial effect on the
evolution of cooperation in spatial population. First, for
low temptation to defect, coherence resonance is found
for all three types of lattice, i.e., there is an optimal noise
level for promoting cooperation. Second, for an interme-
diate temptation to defect, we observe a two-peak behav-
ior (for Moore and kagome lattices) — the first maxima
at zero noise, the other at a moderate noise levels (on
the von Neumann lattice, however, we observe no such
behavior). Third, for even higher temptation levels, only
no noise maximizes cooperation. Moreover, we find that
in the low-noise limit, the local lattice structure deter-
mines the fate of cooperators. We find, in the case of
high temptation values, a structure of triangles overlap-
ping at one site to benefit cooperation compared to a
structure of triangles overlapping at multiple sites. For
low temptation values, the situation is reversed and the
multiply overlapping triangles are beneficial. Our MC-
simulation results are in good agreement with theoretical
predictions obtained from mean-field cluster approxima-
tion methods. These results may enrich our knowledge of
the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured pop-
ulations. A possible extension of the present work is to
consider evolutionary PD on degree-heterogeneous net-
works with the incorporation of asymmetric direction of
strategy migration. We expect that degree-heterogeneity
would induce a stronger difference in the final results, as
was found in voter model on such networks [35, 47].
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APPENDIX A: A CONCRETE EXAMPLE
In this Appendix we present a small example illus-
trating how the voter-like dynamics supports cooperation
better than the invasion-like dynamics. For the sake of
simplicity we consider a small system — a 4 × 4 square
lattice with von Neumann neighborhood and periodic
8(b)
i
j
i
jk
C= D=
(a)
FIG. 9: Illustration of a small system with 4 × 4 players.
(a) Both VMLD and IPLD give out the same transformation
probability for j to change from a defector to a cooperator.
(b) The VMLD favors better the diffusion of cooperation than
the IPLD when the interface is rugged.
boundary conditions. Initially, half of the sites of the
lattice are occupied by cooperators, and the other half
by defectors as shown in Fig. 9(a). We focus our at-
tention on the probability of strategy-migration of one
focal player, say j, changing from D to C. In the case
of VMLD, this may happen when the individual j is se-
lected to update its state and choose the neighbor i as
reference, which happens with probability 1/4. Accord-
ing to the payoff matrix of the PD, the individual i will
get payoff 3, since there are three cooperators and one
defector in its neighborhood. In contrast, the individual
j acquires only payoff b, which comes from the interac-
tion with i. As a consequence, the expected probability
for the player j changing from D to C is
WD→C =
1
4
1
1 + exp[(b − 3)/κ]
(A1)
if VMLD is adopted. This is also the transformation
probability if IPLD is implemented, rather than VMLD.
Thus, on a smooth interface, both VMLD and IPLD
will result in the same probability for strategy-migration.
Since the defectors on the interface gain much less pay-
off than their cooperative neighbors (b is just little larger
than 1), we can expect cooperators could invade some
of them as time evolves. Now, assume the configuration
in Fig. 9(b), where the player j is surrounded by two
cooperators, i and k. In such case, if j is selected to up-
date strategy and VMLD is used, the probability for the
player to become a cooperator is
WD→C =
1
4
(
1
1 + exp[(2b− 3)/κ]
+
1
1 + exp[(2b− 1)/κ]
)
=
1
4
(wij + wkj) (A2)
where wij/4 and wkj/4 denote, respectively, the probabil-
ity of i’s strategy, k’s strategy convincing j. If, however,
IPLD is adopted, the individual j could be imposed on
the cooperative strategy either by i or k, whose proba-
bility is given by
WD→C = 1− (1− wij/4)(1− wkj/4)
=
1
4
(
wij + wkj −
wijwkj
4
)
, (A3)
which is smaller than the corresponding value from
Eq. (A2). Note that we have assumed the neighbors of i,
j, and k, have not changed their strategies between the
two events (from the updating time of i to that of j). In
sum this illustrates how the VMLD favors the migration
of cooperative strategy along the interface separating co-
operators and defectors as compared to the IPLD. Note
that this argument cannot be reversed to hold for cooper-
ators instead of defectors (considering say i in Fig. 9(a)
being a defector). The reason is that, on average, the
payoffs of defectors along the interface are smaller than
those of the cooperators [19, 33], which disables the ben-
efit of the VMLD, and thereby inhibits the diffusion of
defection.
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